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THE COLLATERAL MORTGAGE:
A REASSESSMENT AND POSTSCRIPT
Max Nathan, Jr.* and H. Gayle Marshall**
Volume 33 of the Louisiana Law Review' contained an
article by us that we hoped would be a thorough analysis and
exposition of one of the most curious, most obscure, and yet
most practical of legal devices in Louisiana credit transac-
tions, the collateral mortgage. Fundamentally, we are
satisfied with the organization and analysis of that article,
but a reassessment of our own views on an issue discussed in
the article has prompted us to write a brief postscript. In
addition, the legislature in 1975 adopted an important statu-
tory amendment, the need for which was suggested by the
article itself. Consequently, we believe that an update of, or
supplement to, the 1973 article is warranted.
CO-ORDINATION OF INTEREST AND ATTORNEY'S FEES
In the 1973 article, we suggested that it is important for
''certain terms and conditions of the collateral mortgage note
[to] coordinate with corresponding terms and conditions of
the hand note."'2 Our concern was two-fold, attorney's fees
and interest rate provisions. Since the hand note is the true
evidence of indebtedness, if that note does not provide for
attorney's fees, the lender is not entitled to recover attorney's
fees, even if the ne varietur note provides for them. 3 Misled
by the verity of that proposition, for which there was judicial
authority, 4 we stated that a kind of converse propostion, for
which there is no authority, would also be true: if the hand
note provided for attorney's fees but the ne varietur note did
not, then the creditor would be entitled to recover them, but
he would not be secured by the mortgage as to those fees. 5 We
* Professor of Law, Tulane University Law School; Member, New Orleans
Bar.
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1. Nathan & Marshall, The Collateral Mortgage, 33 LA. L. REV. 497 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Nathan & Marshall].
2. Id. at 503.
3. Odom v. Cherokee Homes, 165 So. 2d 855, 871-73 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1964).
4. Id.
5. Specifically, we stated: "If the term (e.g., attorney's fees) is provided
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made the same analysis regarding interest rates: if the ne
varietur note provides for 10% interest, but the hand note
provides only for 8% interest, the creditor is only entitled to
recover, and is only secured, for 8% interest. We again stated
that the converse would be true: if the ne varietur note pro-
vides for 8% interest, but the hand note provides for 10%
interest, the creditor would be entitled to recover the higher
rate of 10% provided in the hand note, but he would only be
secured by the mortgage at the 8% rate.6
In retrospect, and after painstaking analysis, we have
concluded that our statements in regard to co-ordination of
these terms were too dogmatic and may well be incorrect. A
legal principle that applies to the hand note, and thereby the
indebtedness, may not necessarily apply to the collateral that
is security for that note. Nor are interest and attorney's fees
necessarily separate obligations secured by separate collat-
eral. Our chagrin is compounded by the fact that the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeal, in a recent case, Baton Rouge Bank
& Trust Co. v. Subco, Inc.,7 has cited and quoted the very
conclusion of this part of our article at the same time that we
were in the process of revising our thinking.8
The underlying difficulty with our original analysis is the
assumption that interest and attorney's fees are separate
aspects not only of the indebtedness, but also of the collateral.
In retrospect, we believe that neither aspect of the assump-
tion may be correct. Part of the confusion stems from the
unique nature of the collateral mortgage, which employs two
distinct promissory notes, the hand note and the ne varietur
note. The fact that the hand note governs all the terms of the
actual indebtedness does not necessarily imply that all terms
for in the hand note but not in the 'ne varietur' note, then the creditor is
entitled to recover, but is not secured, as to that item; if the term is provided
for in the 'ne varietur' note, but not in the hand note, then the creditor is not
only unsecured, but not entitled to recover that particular item because it is
not part of the debt." Nathan & Marshall at 503.
6. Id.
7. Baton Rouge Bank & Trust Co. v. Subco, Inc., 306 So. 2d 312 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974).
8. The court split two-to-one, and Judge Redmann declined to join in
what he terms the "unexplained obiter suggestion that a pledge to secure a
note only secures interest and attorney's fees to the extent that the thing
pledged itself carries interest and attorney's fees." Id. at 315. Fortunately,
the question of such co-ordination of terms was not essential to the outcome
of the case, and the quotation from our article is pure obiter dictum.
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of the two notes must co-ordinate. For example, suppose a
$25,000 hand note due one year from date provides for 8%
interest and 10% attorney's fees, and is secured by pledge of a
$50,000 ne varietur note with no provision for either attor-
ney's fees or interest. In that instance, the creditor may be
secured up to $50,000, i.e., the principal amount of the ne
varietur note, in principal, interest and attorney's fees. As-
suming the debtor defaults at maturity of the hand note, he
would owe $25,000 principal, $2,000 interest, and $2,700 attor-
ney's fees, for a total debt of $29,700, all of which is secured by
the $50,000 mortgage and ne varietur note.
The issue is perhaps highlighted by the example of an
ordinary pledge situation, removing the use of a second note
from the illustration. If the debtor pledges $50,000 of General
Motors stock to secure a note for $25,000 principal, 8% in-
terest, and 10% attorney's fees, and he defaults one year
later, the creditor can indisputably collect the full amount of
principal ($25,000), interest ($2,000), and attorney's fees
($2,700) from the pledge of the General Motors stock.
The problem, of course, is that the pledge of a collateral
mortgage note is not an ordinary pledge.9 The collateral
mortgage is a hybrid security device, neither fully pledge nor
fully mortgage. It utilizes legal rules applicable to both de-
vices, but at the same time it also departs from some very
basic legal rules as to each that would otherwise be applica-
ble.10
Which rules apply and which do not? The ne varietur note
is nothing more than collateral security and does not repre-
sent the indebtedness. The hand note governs the indebted-
ness; two rules apply. First, irrespective of the principal
amount of the ne varietur note, the creditor is only entitled to
recover the principal indebtedness represented by the hand
note." Second, irrespective of provisions for attorney's fees
9. Wallace v. Fidelity Nat'l Bank, 219 So. 2d 342 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 221 So. 2d 517 (1969), holding that a written instrument is not neces-
sary for the validity against third parties of a pledge of a negotiable instru-
ment under LA. CIV. CODE art. 3158; and therefore the pledge of the ne
varietur note may be a valid pledge not only between the parties but as to
third parties even if there is no hand note executed.
10. E.g., it departs from the principle that a mortgage is only valid if
there is an underlying principal obligation. See Nathan & Marshall at 498.
11. This is true because a security device is merely an accessory obliga-
1976]
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and interest in the ne varietur note, the creditor is only
entitled to recover the attorney's fees and interest provided
in the hand note.12
In every day occurrence, a creditor may be entitled to
recover a larger sum than the value of the collateral by which
he is secured, as if D pledges $10,000 worth of General Motors
stock to secure a $20,000 debt. Or the opposite may occur; the
creditor may be oversecured and not entitled to recover as
much as the value of the security, as if D pledges $20,000
worth of General Motors stock to secure a $10,000 debt. There
are, then, two eminently practical aspects of the secured
transaction which must be carefully distinguished: (1) the
debt itself and (2) the security for that debt. In the collateral
mortgage situation, the mortgage note is security only; it is
not the debt. To determine the value of that security, one
must look to the mortgage. The hand note, however, repre-
sents the debt, and to determine how much, and what, the
creditor is entitled to recover, one can and must look only to
the hand note.
On deeper reflection, it now seems to us that interest and
attorney's fees are integral aspects of the debt itself and are
not separate debts or obligations in and of themselves. 13
Whether attorney's fees, for example, are stipulated in the
security for the debt is clearly irrelevant to the issue of the
creditor's right to recover them. Whether attorney's fees are
stipulated in the ne varietur note also seems irrelevant to the
issue of whether the creditor is secured as to those fees. If the
creditor is entitled to recover attorney's fees by virtue of the
hand note, then he is secured as to those fees by all of the
collateral.1 4
Interest is defined in the Louisiana Civil Code as "dam-
ages due for delay in the performance of an obligation to pay
money," 15 but more realistically, interest is not damages or a
penalty but compensation for the use of one's money. Put
bluntly, as to conventional interest at least, the interest rate
is nothing more than the price of money. 16 Numerous articles
tion. The hand note is the principal obligation. E.g., LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3136,
3284.
12. Id.
13. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1935-44, 2924-25.
14. Id. art. 3164.
15. Id. art. 1935.
16. If you do not believe it, see M. MAYER, THE BANKERS, 271-95 (1974).
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of the Louisiana Civil Code deal with conventional interest
and legal interest, and litigation over the years has addressed
questions concerning interest, such as when, how and
whether it is collectible.' 7 A review of some of those articles
and cases convinces us that interest is not a separate aspect
of the debt, but rather an integral part of it.
For example, Article 2164 provides that if a debt bears
interest, every payment that does not extinguish both princi-
pal and interest must be first imputed to payment of in-
terest.'8 A similar kind of imputation exists in the Code arti-
cles on pledge, and indeed the closest support for our original
view may be found in Article 3169, which provides that interest
paid on a credit that is pledged must be deducted from the
interest due on the debt.' 9 For example, A executes a note
bearing interest and made payable to B; B pledges the note of
A to C to secure B's debt; A pays interest on his note and C
must credit that interest on the interest owed by B. But
Article 3169 also provides that if the debt for which the credit
has been pledged does not bear interest, then the payment is
deducted on the principal of the debt. The rule of Article 3169
is thus a kind of imputation of payments rule, applying in-
terest to interest. It does not, however, support the proposi-
tion that interest provisions of one note are secured only by
interest provisions of the other note. On the contrary, the
stronger support among the other pledge articles is for the
view that interest is simply an integral part of the debt.
Article 3163 states the principle that pledge is indivisible,
and that one cannot retake pledged items "without satisfying
the whole debt.' 20 And Article 3164 amplifies that rule in
terms that strongly support the revised view:
17. See explanation in note 11, supra. See Succession of Cristina, 299 So.
2d 422 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (Interest on inheritance taxes is based on the
statute in effect at the time of death of the testator without regard to
amendment of the interest rate schedule since his death and since the taxes
became due; being "interest" in the true sense, i.e. compensation and not a
penalty, the later amendment has no effect.). See also Parish of East Baton
Rouge v. Harrison, 260 So. 2d 106 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Womack v. Travel-
ers Ins. Co., 258 So. 2d 562 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972) (The amendment to LA. CIV.
CODE art. 1938 to increase legal interest from 5% to 7% was not given
retroactive effect.).
18. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2164.
19. Id. art. 3169.
20. Id. art. 3163.
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The creditor who is in possession of the pledge can only
be compelled to return it, but when he has received the
whole payment of the principal as well as the interest and
costs.
2 1
Under Article 3164, then, the pledgee-mortgagee in the col-
lateral mortgage situation, being in possession of the ne vari-
etur note, can only be compelled to return the ne varietur
note when he has received the whole payment of principal
and interest as provided in the hand note. Obviously under
those terms the hand note is fully secured as to principal and
interest by the mortgage, and not interest-for-interest and
principal-for-principal. And Article 3164, immediately follow-
ing Article 3163, plainly implies that interest comprises a part
of the "whole debt."
Our earlier analysis assumed that the obligation to pay
interest is secured only by the interest provisions of the ne
varietur note and mortgage; similarly our analysis assumed
that the obligation to pay attorney's fees is secured only by
the attorney's fees provisions of the ne varietur note and
mortgage. That assumption is not true for ordinary pledges of
any other kind of property, and it is not the general civil law
rule. 22 Arguably, a different rule could apply to the collateral
mortgage, because it is a unique, hybrid device and the col-
lateral is a note. But that analysis requires treating the col-
lateral mortgage note as a debt, which it is not. And it further
requires treating interest and attorney's fees as separate as-
pects of a debt. The sounder analysis seems to us to be to
apply the general rule and treat stipulations for interest and
attorney's fees in the hand note as being integral parts of the
indebtedness, and not to treat them as separate and distinct
obligations, secured by separate and distinct collateral or
security. The obligation to pay interest differs from the obli-
gation to re-pay principal, because interest accrues and prin-
cipal does not, but both obligations stem from the same indebt-
edness, evidenced by the hand note. And both obligations
are secured by the same collateral, i.e., the ne varietur note
and mortgage.
We have thus revised our views and now suggest that the
full principal amount of the collateral mortgage secures the




principal of the hand note and any other indebtedness of the
hand note, such as interest or attorney's fees. Our earlier
view gave rise to a tripartite oddity: principal of one note
securing only principal of the other, interest of one note sec-
uring only interest of the other; and attorney's fees of one
note securing only attorney's fees of the other.23
In light of our revised thinking we now believe that an
additional rule logically follows. If the ne varietur note does
not provide for interest or attorney's fees, or if it provides for
a lesser amount than the hand note, the creditor is nonethe-
less fully secured by the total mortgage in all its respects, i.e.,
principal, interest, and attorney's fees, for all obligations pro-
vided for in the hand note.
INTERRUPTION OF PRESCRIPTION OF OBLIGATIONS
In the 1973 article, we recommended modification of the
inartistically drawn statute, adopted in 1970, that provided
that "partial payment" of a promissory note by the maker
interrupts prescription on all promissory notes that have
been pledged by the maker to secure it. The statute was
defective in several respects; it was overly broad and, as
written, could apply to notes of third parties, a result obvi-
ously not intended. Nor did it clearly define partial payments,
which may or may not have included payments of interest
only.24
I Act 119 of 1975 amended La. R.S. 9:5807 to read as fol-
lows:
A payment by a debtor of interest or principal of an obli-
gation shall constitute an acknowledgment of all other
obligations including promissory notes of such debtor or
his codebtors in solido pledged by the debtor or his codebt-
23. An even more sophisticated problem is to hypothesize the situation
where the principal of the mortgage note is less than the principal of the
hand note, but when coupled with interest and attorney's fees, the value of
the security equals or exceeds the debt of the hand note. To he consistent, the
analysis should conclude that the principal, interest and attorney's fees pro-
visions of the mortgage note all secure the principal debt evidenced by the
hand note.
24. LA. R.S. 9:5807, as enacted by La. Acts 1970, No. 354, merely referred
to "partial payment" of a promissory note, which could have been construed
to mean a payment of principal only, since a payment of interest did not
reduce the note. This very argument has been raised in proceedings involv-
ing a substantial mortgage in New Orleans.
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ors in solido to secure the obligation as to which payment
is made. In all cases the party claiming an interruption of
prescription of such pledged obligation including a prom-
issory note as a result of such acknowledgment shall have
the burden of proving all of the elements necessary to
establish the same. 25
The 1975 amendment changed the law in several impor-
tant respects. It applies to all "obligations" rather than to
promissory notes only. The 1970 act only applied to payments
made by the maker on a note. The new phraseology is much
broader, but the statute obviously is aimed at collateral
mortgage notes and hand notes. Also, payment is deemed to
constitute an "acknowledgment" of the other obligations,
rather than an interruption of prescription, as under the 1970
statute. By definition, however, an acknowledgment automat-
ically interrupts prescription,2 6 so that the desired result
clearly obtains, but it is expressed in broader civil law terms.
Third, the 1975 act specifically defines payment to include
payments of either interest or principal, thereby curing the
ambiguity that existed in the 1970 statute. This change ac-
cords with the general law, since the payment of interest or
principal constitutes an acknowledgment sufficient to inter-
rupt prescription on an ordinary promissory note.2 7 The 1975
act creates an acknowledgment whenever any solidary debtor
of the obligation makes a payment. Under prior law the pay-
ment had to be made by the maker of the note. The change
reaches the same desired results, expressed in broader civil
law terminology. The effect of the statute as amended is sub-
stantially broadened beyond the collateral mortgage situa-
tion and the statute now applies not only to promissory notes
but also to all obligations of the debtor or his codebtors in
solido that are pledged to secure the obligation on which
payment is made.
The 1975 statute removes the rather specific burden of
proof in the 1970 act, which required the creditor to prove
that the collateral mortgage note was in fact pledged to secure
the hand note as to which partial payment was made and that
25. LA. R.S. 9:5807, as amended by La. Acts 1975, No. 119.
26. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3520 (1870).
27. See Zimmer v. Fryer, 190 La. 814, 183 So. 166 (1938); Lawrence v.




the creditor was the holder of both of the notes at the time of
payment. The 1975 act deletes these requirements and simply
provides that the party claiming an interruption of prescrip-
tion as a result of the "acknowledgment" provided in the
statute has the burden of proving all of the elements neces-
sary to establish such interruption. The result is to remove
highly specific and particularized requirements and refer to
the general law on interruption of prescription. Clearly the
creditor still maintains the burden of proof and the facts he
must prove are similar to the facts he previously had to
prove, but the application is broader.
The new act does not contain language making it retroac-
tive, which would be of doubtful validity, and because of the
existence of R.S. 9:5807 since 1970, such language was un-
necessary as a practical matter. To the authors' knowledge,
there have been numerous cases at the district court level
since 1970 challenging the applicability of or the effect of the
statute, and raising issues as to its proper interpretation, but
no such case has yet reached the appellate level. For example,
several cases challenged the applicability of the old law where
only payments of interest had been made on the hand note,
thereby raising the issue that a payment of principal was
required to effect an interruption of prescription on the ne
varietur note.28 Other cases have involved situations where
prescription began to run on the ne varietur note prior to
1970 (e.g., a collateral mortgage executed in 1967) but pay-
ments were made on the hand note after 1970.29 Time, and the
new statute, will cure any such problems.
We submit that the new act, adopted in 1975, effectively
remedies the defects of the 1970 statute and properly applies
broad principles of the general civil law rather than highly
technical language to solve a specific, particularized problem.
A sound approach in the best civil law tradition, the 1975
amendment to La. R.S. 9:5807 is a major step forward in
making the collateral mortgage more effective as a security
device.
28. Alison Mortgage Inv. Trust v. Marie Antoniette Inc., Civil Action No.
75-3165 (E.D. La. 1976); Alison Mortgage Inv. Trust v. Marie Antoniette, Inc.,
CDC# 596-565 (Orleans); First Toulouse Corp. v. Alison Mortgage Inv. Trust,
CDC# 596-255 (Orleans).
29. Professional Plaza West v. Int'l City Bank & Trust Co., CDC# 584-533
(Orleans); Int'l City Bank & Trust Co. v. Professional Plaza West, CDC#
584-479 (Orleans).
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